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Socrates’	Bleak	View	of	the	Human	Condition	Russell	E.	Jones		It’s	true,	after	all,	that	the	matters	in	dispute	between	us	are	not	at	all	insignificant	ones,	but	pretty	nearly	those	it’s	most	admirable	to	have	knowledge	about,	and	most	shameful	not	to.		For	the	heart	of	the	matter	is	that	of	recognizing	or	failing	to	recognize	who	is	happy	and	who	is	not.		 -Gorgias	472c6-d1	[Socrates	to	Polus;	Zeyl	trans.]		 Was	Socrates,	by	his	own	lights,	happy?		I	recently	argued	that	he	wasn’t.1		Couple	such	a	view	with	Socrates’	assessment	of	nearly	everyone	else	as	even	worse	off	than	himself,	and	we	get	a	bleak	outlook	on	the	human	condition.		Professor	Smith	alleges	(in	this	volume)	that	I	misconstrue	several	aspects	of	Socrates’	thought.		Once	corrected,	we	can	dispense	with	this	bleak	outlook.		Unfortunately	–	and	I	do	mean	unfortunately,	since	Smith’s	is	the	more	cheerful	view	–	the	bleak	outlook	remains	the	one	we	should	attribute	to	Socrates.		Here	I	explain	why,	first	giving	a	brief	synopsis	of	my	earlier	argument,	but	then	confining	myself	to	new	considerations.	I	began	with	the	“death	is	one	of	two	things”	argument	at	Apology	40c5-41a8.		The	argument	is	uncontroversially	a	constructive	dilemma	in	form:	1.		Death	is	one	of	two	things:		Either	(a)	the	dead	are	nothing	and	have	no	perception	of	anything,	or	(b)	death	is	a	change	and	relocating	for	the	soul	from	here	to	another	place.	2.		If	(a),	then	death	is	an	advantage.	3.		If	(b),	then	death	is	an	advantage.	4.		So,	death	is	an	advantage.		
                                                1	See	Jones	2013	for	full	details	of	the	argument,	including	texts	and	scholarship.	
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The	first	question	to	ask,	naturally,	is:		an	advantage	for	whom?		And	the	answer,	in	the	first	instance,	is:		an	advantage	for	Socrates.		He	is	explaining	to	the	jurors	why	his	death	is	a	good	thing.		In	fact,	just	before,	he	has	given	reasons	for	thinking	death	is	a	good	thing	that	apply	only	to	him:		His	own	divine	sign	has	not	opposed	him	today.		The	“death	is	one	of	two	things”	argument	is	meant	to	provide	additional	reasons	for	thinking	that	Socrates’	death	is	a	good	thing.		But	in	this	argument	he	provides	reasons	that	do	not	apply	especially	to	him.		Indeed,	he	supposes	that	those	features	of	his	own	life	that	warrant	the	conclusion	will	be	shared	by	most	if	not	all	other	people.		And	so	even	as	he	reaches	a	conclusion	about	his	own	circumstances,	he	offers	one	that	will	apply	quite	broadly.	The	argument,	contrary	to	near	universal	opinion,	is	a	rather	good	piece	of	reasoning.		The	first	premise	is	quite	plausible:		Death	is	either	simply	the	end	for	us	or	it	is	a	relocation	of	the	soul.		We	might	fuss	about	the	third	premise:		Why	think	that	if	death	is	a	change	and	relocating	for	the	soul	from	here	to	another	place,	then	death	is	an	advantage?		Mightn’t	the	afterlife	be	hellish?		Not	if	we	allow	Socrates	to	appeal	to	a	background	commitment	which	he	clearly	holds,	that	the	gods	are	good.		Any	serious	implausibility	will	have	to	be	located	in	the	second	premise,	that	if	the	dead	are	nothing	and	have	no	perception	of	anything,	then	death	is	an	advantage.		Criticism	tends	to	focus	on	the	analogy	Socrates	gives:		death,	understood	as	annihilation,	is	like	a	dreamless	sleep.		A	dreamless	sleep	is	pleasant	only	because	you	wake	up	from	it.		But	you	don’t	wake	up	from	death.		So	the	analogy	is	inapt.	Such	an	objection	misses	the	point.		Socrates	does	not	say	that	a	dreamless	sleep	is	pleasant.		Rather,	he	encourages	us	to	compare	the	days	and	nights	of	our	lives	to	a	dreamless	sleep.		In	other	words,	he	ranks	our	lives	against	a	completely	unconscious	state.		
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Such	a	state	is	completely	neutral:		it	is	neither	good	nor	bad,	for	it	is	not	anything.		To	rank	a	life	higher	than	such	a	state	is	to	say	that	it	is	better	than	neutral;	to	rank	it	lower	is	to	say	that	it	is	worse	than	neutral.		And	so,	to	extend	the	point	explicitly	to	death,	to	say	that	death	understood	as	annihilation	is	an	advantage	over	life	is	to	say	that	life	is	worse	than	neutral.		It	is	to	say	that	one	is	living	a	life	that	doesn’t	rise	to	the	level	of	being	worth	living,	that	one	would	be	better	off	not	existing	at	all.		Now,	it’s	one	thing	to	fuss	about	whether	it	is	accurate	to	rank	annihilation	above	life,	whether	for	Socrates	or	for	the	Great	King	or	for	ourselves.		What	I	want	to	emphasize	is	that	Socrates	commits	himself	to	the	ranking.		He	ranks	his	life,	in	company	with	most	others,	below	non-existence.		A	life	that	ranks	below	non-existence	is	not	a	happy	one.		So,	Socrates	assesses	his	own	life	as	less	than	happy.	To	see	that	Socrates’	argument	implies	that	he	is	not	happy	is	not	yet	to	see	why	he	takes	himself	not	to	be	happy.		Here,	I	claim,	we	can	appeal	to	some	pretty	conventional	understandings	of	Socrates	to	explain	his	self-assessment.		Socrates	makes	frequent	claims	that	virtue,	understood	as	a	kind	of	ethical	knowledge,	is	necessary	for	happiness.		And	yet,	he	equally	frequently	denies	that	he	possesses	the	ethical	knowledge	that	is	virtue.		If	we	take	these	two	commitments	-	to	the	necessity	of	virtue	for	happiness	and	to	his	own	lack	of	virtue	-	straightforwardly,	they	explain	why	Socrates	takes	his	own	life	to	fall	short	of	happiness:		He	lacks	a	necessary	condition	for	happiness.		Rather	than	linger	on	the	way	I	understand	Socrates’	claims,	I	want	to	turn	to	the	way	Smith	understands	them,	for	much	of	what	he	has	to	say	about	the	connection	between	virtue	and	happiness	is	plausible	but	perfectly	compatible	with	my	account.		I	would	even	go	so	far	as	to	say	that	attending	carefully	to	Smith’s	insights	strengthens	my	case.	
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Smith	objects	to	my	understanding	of	Socrates’	disavowals	of	knowledge	and	commitment	to	the	necessity	of	virtue	for	happiness.		In	short,	he	argues	that	Socrates	disavows	full	ethical	knowledge,	rather	than	any	measure	at	all	of	ethical	knowledge;	and	that	Socrates	takes	knowledge	and	happiness	to	be	gradable,	and	furthermore	takes	it	that	one	needs	greater	and	greater	degrees	of	knowledge	in	order	to	achieve	greater	and	greater	degrees	of	happiness.		I	focus	on	the	latter	point.	In	passages	in	which	Socrates	argues	for	the	necessity	of	wisdom	(as	I	shall	call	ethical	knowledge)	for	happiness,	he	often	does	so	by	appeal	to	the	crafts.		Consider	a	passage	from	the	Euthydemus	(281a1-b6):			 “Well	then,	in	working	and	using	things	concerning	wood,	surely	there	is	nothing	else	that	produces	correct	use	than	knowledge	of	carpentry?”		 “Clearly	not,”	he	said.		 “And	also	in	work	concerning	utensils,	the	producer	of	the	correctness	is	knowledge.”		 He	agreed.		 “Then,”	I	said,	“also	concerning	the	use	of	the	first	of	the	goods	we	spoke	of	-	wealth	and	health	and	beauty	-	was	it	knowledge	which	directed	and	made	our	action	correct	with	respect	to	using	all	such	things	correctly,	or	something	else?”		 “Knowledge,”	he	said.		 “It	seems	then	that	knowledge	provides	people	not	only	with	good	fortune	but	also	with	well-doing,	in	all	possession	and	action.”		 He	agreed.		 “Then,	by	Zeus,”	I	said,	“is	there	any	benefit	from	other	possessions	without	intelligence	and	wisdom?”		Smith	notes	that	if	we	are	to	take	the	appeal	to	other	crafts	seriously	here,	we	cannot	suppose	that	Socrates	is	saying	that	full	knowledge	is	required	for	any	correct	action	or	benefit.		For	surely	this	would	be	implausible	in	the	case	of	carpentry.		Carpentry	is	graded,	such	that	between	the	complete	novice	and	the	full	master	there	is	a	wide	range	of	other	skill	levels.		We	can	expect	someone	to	succeed	in	carpentry	to	the	extent	that	they	
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have	mastered	the	craft.		But	it	would	be	implausible	to	suppose	that	someone	who	falls	short	of	full	mastery	is	therefore	doomed	to	failure.		Yes,	the	master	carpenter	will	succeed	most,	but	we	should	expect	others	to	succeed	roughly	in	keeping	with	the	level	of	skill	they	have	achieved.		Likewise	for	virtue:		It	is	implausible	to	suppose	that	full	wisdom	is	required	for	any	correct	action	and	any	benefit,	and	thus	any	achievement	of	happiness.		Rather,	we	should	expect	people	to	succeed	in	attaining	their	own	well-being	to	the	extent	that	they	acquire	wisdom.	Now,	the	effect	that’s	supposed	to	have	on	the	present	debate	is	to	block	my	move	from	Socratic	ignorance	to	Socratic	unhappiness.		For	surely	Socrates	doesn’t	mean	to	indicate	that	he	is	wholly	ignorant	about	how	to	live	his	life,	a	complete	novice	when	it	comes	to	virtue.		But	that	opens	the	door	to	conceiving	of	him	as	having	achieved	some	level	of	happiness.			So	far,	I	agree,	even	with	the	final	point	that	Socrates’	conception	of	moral	knowledge	does	not	on	its	own	foreclose	the	possibility	that	he	has	achieved	some	level	of	happiness.		If	virtue	is	a	kind	of	expertise,	we	should	think	of	it	as	gradable.2		Yet	none	of	this	is	reason	to	doubt	seriously	that	Socrates	maintained	a	bleak	outlook	on	the	human	condition.		Consider	carpentry	again,	and	imagine	someone	trying	to	build	a	house.		This	is	a	very	complex	task,	involving	a	number	of	interconnected	elements.		The	master	carpenter	will	execute	each	element	skillfully	and	successfully,	and	thus	the	overall	product	of	her	work	will	be	a	well-crafted	house.		The	complete	novice,	on	the	other	hand,	will	execute	pretty	much	none	of	the	elements	skillfully	or	successfully.		Thus	the	overall	product	of	his	work	will	be	a	terrible	house,	if	he	even	manages	to	produce	something	that	could	be	called	
                                                2	For	an	account	of	Socrates’	conception	of	virtue	as	a	complex	expertise,	see	Hagen	2013.	
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a	house	at	all.		This	leaves	lots	of	room	in	the	middle	for	would-be	house	builders	of	varying	skills,	and	as	a	rough	guide	we	can	suppose	that	the	quality	of	the	final	product	will	vary	with	the	degree	of	skill.	But	notice	just	how	much	this	leaves	open.		One	thing	it	leaves	open	is	how	good	a	house	needs	to	be	before	it	counts	as	minimally	decent.		Surely	it	shouldn’t	be	dangerously	unstable;	it	should	provide	a	certain	amount	of	shelter;	and	it	should	have	some	minimal	aesthetic	quality.		But	for	the	moment,	conceive	of	this	collection	of	minimal	standards	however	you	like.		Even	fairly	low	standards	may	be	hard	to	satisfy.		For	remember	that	house-building	is	a	complicated	task.		Someone	who	learns	enough	to	successfully	execute	one	task	related	to	house-building	may	not	have	the	skills	to	execute	some	other	tasks.		And	since	the	sub-tasks	of	house-building	are	not	merely	additive	but	interdependent,	failure	to	execute	some	tasks	well	might	not	only	fail	to	add	value	to	the	house,	but	might	even	undermine	the	good	of	tasks	that	were,	considered	just	on	their	own,	well-executed.		Someone	who	knows	how	to	put	up	straight	walls	but	doesn’t	know	how	to	lay	a	stable	foundation	doesn’t	get	things	half	right,	but	rather	all	wrong.		Ignorance	about	laying	foundations	undermines	the	value	of	the	knowledge	of	wall-construction.	So	it	is	with	a	life.		On	the	one	hand,	we	need	to	decide	what	minimal	standards	a	life	needs	to	meet	before	it	counts	as	happy	to	some	degree.		I	don’t	want	to	make	a	proposal	about	that	here,	either	for	myself	or	on	behalf	of	Socrates:		I	note	only	that	how	high	you	take	the	minimal	standards	to	be	makes	an	enormous	difference	in	how	achievable	a	minimally	happy	life	is.		But,	again,	specify	them	how	you	like.		Constructing	such	a	life	will	be	a	complex	task.		And	getting	certain	things	wrong	may	not	merely	fail	to	add	to	the	goodness	of	a	life,	but	may	actually	undermine	aspects	of	the	life	that	might	otherwise	have	
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been	good.		It	is	not	a	trivial	move	from	supposing	that	wisdom	and	happiness	are	gradable	and	that	greater	wisdom	will	tend	to	greater	happiness	to	the	claim	that	some	minimal	happiness	is	fairly	achievable.		To	make	that	move,	we’d	first	have	to	determine	what	minimal	standards	a	life	must	meet	to	count	as	happy	at	all;	and	then	to	determine	what	degree	of	wisdom	is	required	to	achieve	such	standards.		Even	if	we	concede	that	the	standards	are	fairly	low,	it	does	not	at	all	follow	that	the	degree	of	wisdom	required	to	meet	them	is	low.		And	the	higher	we	set	the	standards,	and	the	more	complex	we	take	the	construction	of	a	good	life	to	be,	the	greater	will	be	the	degree	of	wisdom	required	to	meet	the	standards.	So,	just	as	one	might	have	developed	skills	in	house-building	significantly	greater	than	those	of	a	complete	novice	and	yet	not	be	able	to	construct	a	minimally	good	house,	so	one	might	have	developed	skills	in	living	significantly	greater	than	those	of	a	complete	novice	and	yet	not	be	able	to	construct	a	minimally	happy	life.		Indeed,	suppose	that	Socrates	has	developed	skills	in	living	significantly	greater	than	those	of	a	complete	novice.		The	“death	is	one	of	two	things	argument”	reveals	that	he	doesn’t	take	whatever	degree	of	wisdom	he	has	achieved	to	be	enough	for	him	to	attain	a	minimal	level	of	happiness.	This	shouldn’t	be	surprising,	if	we	reflect	on	how	Socrates	characterizes	what	degree	of	wisdom	he	has	achieved	in	those	very	texts	we’ve	been	considering.		In	the	
Apology,	he	claims	not	to	know	anything	“καλὸν	κἀγαθόν”	(21d4)	-	nothing	“fine	and	good”	-	and	a	bit	later	(23a5-b5)	says	that	the	god	intended	to	indicate	that	any	wisdom	Socrates	has	is	worthless	or	nearly	so.		That’s	a	strange	way	to	characterize	matters	if	Socrates	thinks	that	his	wisdom	makes	him	happy,	even	if	he	doesn’t	think	it	makes	him	maximally	happy.		In	the	Euthydemus,	he	similarly	downplays	the	value	of	his	knowledge,	allowing	
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that	he	knows	quite	a	lot	of	things,	but	characterizing	them	all	as	of	little	account	(“σμικρά”;	293b7-8).		Even	more	tellingly,	in	this	dialogue	Socrates	cannot	even	characterize	what	wisdom	or	virtue	is	in	broad	terms.		Socrates	is	no	physician,	yet	he	could	tell	you	that	medicine	is	the	skill	of	restoring	health	to	bodies.		Socrates	is	no	farmer,	yet	he	could	tell	you	that	farming	is	the	skill	of	getting	nutrition	from	the	earth.		But	he	doesn’t	even	get	this	far	when	it	comes	to	describing	virtue!		That	is	hardly	the	mark	of	a	partial	expert	who	can	do	a	lot	of	good	in	his	field,	but	who	simply	hasn’t	achieved	full	mastery	yet.		It	rather	indicates	someone	who	is	much	closer	to	the	novice	end	of	the	spectrum.		And	this	is	perfectly	in	keeping	with	the	plain	sense	of	the	“death	is	one	of	two	things”	argument.	What	alternative	sense	might	we	make	of	the	“death	is	one	of	two	things”	argument?		Smith	proposes	to	understand	it	as	follows.		Socrates’	professed	aim	is	to	convince	his	friends	that	“what	has	happened	[his	conviction	and	sentencing]	may	well	be	a	good	thing,	and	those	of	us	who	believe	death	to	be	an	evil	are	certainly	mistaken”	(40b7-c2;	Grube	trans.).		Smith	thinks	that	the	second	horn	of	the	dilemma,	that	death	is	a	relocation	for	the	soul,	answers	to	the	first	part	of	this	aim:		what	has	happened	may	well	be	a	good	thing.		And	he	reads	the	first	horn	of	the	dilemma,	that	the	dead	are	nothing	and	have	no	perception	of	anything,	as	answering	to	the	second	part	of	this	aim:		those	of	us	who	believe	death	to	be	an	evil	are	certainly	mistaken.		As	Smith	puts	it	(p.	##):	Strictly	speaking,	then,	what	Socrates	needs	to	do	if	he	is	to	console	his	“friends”	among	the	jurors	is	to	give	them	some	reason	to	think	that	death	is	not	the	“worst	of	evils”	and	perhaps	not	even	anything	bad	at	all.		If	he	can	go	on	and	actually	give	them	some	reason	for	thinking	that	“what	has	happened	may	well	be	a	good	thing,”	then	so	much	the	better.				On	Smith’s	view,	Socrates’	purpose	is	accomplished	by	appeal	to	an	obvious	fact,	that	we	often	look	forward	to	the	loss	of	consciousness	that	comes	with	sleep,	no	matter	what	our	
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day	has	been	like	and	even	if	we	don’t	know	that	we	will	ever	wake	up.		I’m	not	convinced	this	is	obvious,	or	even	true.		Regardless,	it	opens	Socrates	up	to	a	standard	set	of	objections	that	rely	on	the	disanalogy	between	annihilation	and	a	dreamless	sleep.		In	the	face	of	such	objections,	the	best	we	can	do,	it	seems,	is	to	recognize	that	Socrates	is	guilty	of	“overstatement”	or	“hyperbole”,	but	to	insist	that	it	is	innocent	because	the	jurors	aren’t	going	to	take	his	remarks	“quite	literally”.		 This,	in	effect,	is	to	give	up	on	reading	Socrates’	argument	as	an	argument,	even	though	he	presents	it	as	such.		Or	at	the	very	least,	it	is	to	concede	that	as	an	argument	it	is	fundamentally	misguided,	and	that	any	persuasive	force	it	may	have	is	to	be	found	in	its	rhetorical	rather	than	its	logical	power.		This	interpretation	abandons	the	straightforward	reading	of	the	argument	in	order	to	avoid	the	implication	that	Socrates	is	unhappy.		But	such	an	interpretation	comes	at	too	high	a	cost,	convicting	Socrates	of	misrepresentation	or	poor	argumentation	in	order	to	save	him	from	a	view	which	he	nowhere	rejects	and	whose	contrary	he	nowhere	endorses.	This	last	claim,	that	Socrates	nowhere	claims	to	be	happy,	requires	some	defense,	for	Smith	appeals	to	a	passage	that	might	be	thought	to	be	the	“smoking-gun”	in	the	case	that	Socrates	was	happy:		Gorgias	527c4-6,	where	Socrates	is	exhorting	Callicles	to	the	life	of	justice.		Socrates	tells	Callicles,	“Ἐμοὶ	οὖν	πειθόμενος	ἀκολούθησον	ἐνταῦθα,	οἷ	ἀφικόμενος	εὐδαιμονήσεις	καὶ	ζῶν	καὶ	τελευτήσας,	ὡς	ὁ	λόγος	σημαίνει.”		If	we	read	with	Zeyl	(as	Smith	does),	the	point	seems	obvious:		“So,	listen	to	me	and	follow	me	to	where	I	am,	and	when	you’ve	come	here	you’ll	be	happy	both	during	life	and	at	its	end,	as	the	account	indicates.”		Socrates	is	claiming	that	Callicles	will	be	happy	if	only	he	gets	to	where	Socrates	is.		Notice	that	even	on	Zeyl’s	rendering,	Socrates	never	quite	says	that	he	is	
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happy,	though	it	is	strongly	implied.		Indeed,	it	is	hard	to	read	Zeyl’s	Gorgias	without	having	the	impression	that	Socrates	takes	himself	to	be	happy.	Zeyl,	however,	mischaracterizes	the	thought	of	the	passage.		The	decision	that	gives	Zeyl’s	rendering	the	crucial	effect	is	the	translation	of	‘ἐνταῦθα’	as	‘here’.		Sometimes	that	is	indeed	an	appropriate	translation	of	‘ἐνταῦθα’.		But	it	can	just	as	easily	be	translated	‘there’,	or,	with	a	sense	of	movement	here	secured	by	the	surrounding	verbal	expressions,	‘thither’.		And	if	we	translate	with	‘there’	instead	of	‘here’,	any	implication	that	Socrates	is	claiming	to	be	happy	immediately	vanishes.3			In	contrast	to	Zeyl,	I	would	render	the	lines	much	as	Irwin,	Lamb,	and	Woodhead	do,4	but	with	one	difference.		I	would	translate	‘ἀκολούθησον’	as	‘accompany’	rather	than	‘follow’,	for	as	e2	makes	clear,	the	logos	is	to	be	the	guide	for	both	of	them:		“And	so	be	persuaded	by	me	and	accompany	me	to	where	you’ll	be	happy	both	in	life	and	in	death,	as	the	account	indicates.”		Socrates	is	here	contrasting	the	way	of	life	he	advocates	with	the	way	of	life	Callicles	advocates.		Just	before,	he	sums	up	the	points	he	has	defended	against	Callicles.		And	shortly	after,	in	the	closing	lines	of	the	dialogue,	he	exhorts	Callicles	to	follow	the	way	of	life	Socrates	advocates,	not	the	worthless	one	Callicles	advocates.		We	might	paraphrase	Socrates’	point	as	follows:		“I’m	already	committed	to	all	these	things,	both	in	
                                                3	One	might	protest	that	Socrates	could	have	used	‘ἐκεῖ’	had	he	wanted	to	indicate	a	point	he	hadn’t	yet	reached.		It	is	true	that	‘ἐκεῖ’	is	a	further	demonstrative	than	‘ἐνταῦθα’.		(Smyth	346,	for	example,	gives	‘there’	for	the	latter	and	‘yonder’	for	the	former.)		But	in	fact	using	‘ἐκεῖ’	at	c5	would	have	been	wholly	misleading,	for	in	the	present	context	it	would	have	signaled	a	concern	exclusively	with	the	afterlife	(as	‘ἐκεῖσε’	at	b2	above,	just	one	sentence	removed	from	c4-6).		Only	‘ἐνταῦθα’	will	do	here.	4	 Irwin:		“And	so	be	convinced	by	me,	and	follow	me	to	where	you	will	be	happy,	both	in	life	and	in	death,	as	the	account	signifies.”	Lamb:		“Take	my	advice,	therefore,	and	follow	me	where,	if	you	once	arrive,	you	will	be	happy	both	in	life	and	after	life’s	end,	as	this	account	declares.”	Woodhead:		“If	you	will	listen	to	me	then,	you	will	follow	me	where	on	your	arrival	you	will	win	happiness	both	in	life	and	after	death,	as	our	account	reveals.”	
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argument	and	in	the	way	I	live	my	life.		So,	you	too,	Callicles,	should	be	persuaded	by	my	argument,	and	as	a	consequence	you	should	adopt	my	way	of	life.		For	the	path	I	am	on	is	the	only	one	that	leads	to	that	point	at	which	you	can	be	happy,	whether	in	life	or	in	death.		That	is	to	say,	when	I	achieve	the	aims	I’m	pursuing	in	my	way	of	life,	I’ll	fare	well;	and	so	will	you,	if	you	do	likewise.”			Nothing	of	what	Socrates	says	here	implies	that	he	takes	himself	to	be	happy.		To	be	sure,	it	is	possible	to	construe	the	lines	as	Zeyl	does.		But	to	depend	so	much	on	a	translation	that	risks	importing	ideas	into	the	text	rather	than	reading	them	out	is	a	bit	like	trying	to	hang	a	ten-gallon	hat	on	a	two-penny	nail.		Much	better	to	render	the	lines	more	neutrally,	and	to	recognize	that	they	then	fit	neatly	with	the	evidence	that	Socrates	took	his	life	to	fall	short	of	happiness.		For	Socrates	never	denies	that	his	aims	are	correct;	he	is	pointed	in	the	right	direction.		He	simply	hasn’t	reached	his	goal.		There	is	no	smoking	gun	at	the	end	of	the	Gorgias;	the	real	smoking	gun	is	the	“death	is	one	of	two	things”	argument.	Now,	I	want	to	go	briefly	beyond	the	dispute	with	Smith	to	another	potentially	troublesome	passage,	this	one	in	Plato’s	Phaedo.		Though	Smith	doesn’t	mention	it,	presumably	because	it	is	not	one	of	the	canonical	Socratic	dialogues,5	it	is	nevertheless	highly	relevant	to	the	Apology.		Given	the	similarities	in	dramatic	context	and	the	many	linguistic	parallels	between	the	two	dialogues,	it	would	be	striking	if	they	adopted	radically	different	outlooks	on	the	question	of	whether	it	is	good	for	Socrates	to	die.		The	particularly	troublesome	bit	I	have	in	mind	is	63b5-9.6		Socrates	says,	“For,	Simmias	and	Cebes,	I	should	be	wrong	not	to	resent	dying	if	I	did	not	believe	that	I	should	go	first	to	other	wise	and	good	gods,	and	then	to	men	who	have	died	and	are	better	than	
                                                5	See,	for	example,	the	list	of	“Socratic	dialogues”	in	Brickhouse	and	Smith	2010,	p.	18.	6	I	thank	Emily	Austin	for	pressing	me	to	say	something	about	this	passage.	
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men	are	here.”	(Grube	trans.)		The	problem	this	passage	causes	is	that	it	looks	as	if	here	Socrates	says	that	he	should	be	troubled	at	death	unless	it	is	the	second	of	the	two	options	that	holds	true	from	the	“death	is	one	of	two	things”	argument,	but	in	the	Apology	Socrates	says	that	he	should	be	of	good	hope	whichever	of	the	two	holds	true.		The	effect,	so	long	as	we’re	willing	to	put	the	Phaedo	into	play,	is	to	put	pressure	on	my	interpretation	–	the	straightforward	interpretation	–	of	the	Apology	argument.	In	fact,	the	resolution	of	this	apparent	tension	between	the	Phaedo	and	the	Apology	is	deceptively	simple.		Up	until	Cebes’	famous	challenge,	which	begins	at	69e6,	the	first	horn	of	the	Apology	dilemma	is	not	even	under	consideration.		The	entire	discussion	up	until	69e6	operates	under	the	assumption	that	the	soul	survives	separation	from	the	body	and	journeys	to	another	place.		(There	is	only	the	tiniest	hint	of	an	alternative,	at	63c5.)		This	is	perhaps	most	clear	at	61d10-e3,	where	Socrates	sets	up	the	discussion	by	saying,	“Perhaps	it	is	most	fitting	for	one	who	is	about	to	sojourn	there	to	investigate	and	tell	stories	about	the	sojourn	there,	what	sort	we	think	it	to	be.”		Socrates	doesn’t	say	that	it	is	most	fitting	to	investigate	whether	there	is	a	sojourn	there;	that	investigation	isn’t	prompted	until	Cebes	steps	in	at	69e6.	So,	the	discussion	assumes	that	there	is	an	afterlife;	that	is,	it	assumes	that	death	is	the	second	of	the	two	things	in	the	Apology.		Socrates	then	announces	that	he	would	be	wrong	not	to	be	troubled	by	death	were	he	not	confident	that	he	would	go	to	good	gods	and	good	men	–	but	the	important	condition,	and	the	one	he	insists	on,	is	that	he	will	go	to	good	gods.		But	it	is	precisely	the	commitment	to	good	gods	that	we	had	to	appeal	to	with	regard	to	the	Apology	argument	in	order	to	avoid	the	objection	that	the	afterlife	might	be	hellish.		Here	we	find	Socrates	making	explicit	the	very	same	commitment	that	he	relies	on	
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implicitly	in	the	Apology,	and	he	invokes	it	in	just	the	way	we	should	have	expected	from	the	Apology.		Assuming	there	is	an	afterlife,	Socrates	should	be	untroubled	by	death	if	and	only	if	he	can	be	confident	that	he	will	be	under	the	care	of	good	gods.		That’s	why	he	goes	on	to	say	(63b9-c7;	Grube	slightly	modified):		“Be	assured	that,	as	it	is,	I	expect	to	join	the	company	of	good	men.		This	last	I	would	not	altogether	insist	on,	but	if	I	insist	on	anything	at	all	in	these	matters,	it	is	that	I	shall	come	to	gods	who	are	very	good	masters.		That	is	why	I	am	not	so	resentful,	because	I	have	good	hope	that	there	is	something	for	those	who	have	died	and	that,	as	is	said	of	old,	it	is	much	better	for	the	good	than	for	the	wicked.”		All	of	this	fits	perfectly	well	with	the	Apology	argument,	at	the	same	time	reinforcing	what	readers	of	the	Apology	typically	suspect:		Socrates	thinks	that	death-as-relocation	is	more	likely	than	death-as-annihilation.		But	none	of	that	should	lead	us	to	discount	his	reflections	on	death-as-annihilation.		He	argues	for	a	conditional	proposition:		If	death	is	annihilation,	then	death	is	a	gain	for	him.		In	sum:		The	straightforward	reading	of	the	“death	is	one	of	two	things”	argument,	taken	on	its	own	terms,	has	the	implication	that	Socrates	takes	his	life	and	most	others	to	fall	short	of	happiness.		We	should	resist	Smith’s	alternative	view,	which	fails	to	make	sense	of	the	argument	as	an	argument.		Graded	conceptions	of	virtue	and	happiness	do	not	undercut	such	a	result.		Indeed,	nothing	in	my	original	argument	is	inconsistent	with	graded	virtue	and	happiness	(I	insisted	explicitly	on	the	latter),	nor	with	a	scaled	necessity	relation	between	the	two.		Moreover,	while	the	Apology	argument	is	a	“smoking-gun”	passage	for	my	position,	there	is	no	such	passage	available	for	the	opposing	position,	not	even	Gorgias	527c4-6.		And	finally,	we	should	remain	unmoved	even	if	we	bring	the	Phaedo	into	play,	for	the	apparent	tension	between	it	and	the	Apology	dissolves	with	attention	to	
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the	larger	structure	of	the	dialogue.		Once	all	this	is	coupled	with	the	arguments	of	my	earlier	paper,	it	becomes	clear	that	the	best	explanation	of	Socrates’	various	commitments	is	that	he	does	in	fact	adopt	the	bleak	view	of	the	human	condition,	and	of	his	own	condition	as	well.		If	we	want	to	understand	Socrates’	conception	of	happiness,	it	is	crucial	to	recognize	this	fact.		To	return	to	the	epigram	(Gorgias	472c6-d1)	and	its	questions	about	who	is	happy	and	how	we	ought	to	live,	our	first	approximation	of	Socrates’	answers	must	be:		not	Socrates,	at	least	in	his	lifetime;	and	we’d	better	aim	pretty	damn	high	when	it	comes	to	virtue.7		Department	of	Philosophy	Harvard	University	Cambridge,	MA		02138				
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